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1Preface:  Executive Summary
Background:
On December 21, 2015, Governor Branstad issued Executive Order 87 (EO87); a cybersecurity initiative for 
the State of Iowa.  The executive order establishes a multi-agency partnership, the EO87 Leadership Team, 
with the Office of the Chief Information Officer, Iowa National Guard, Department of Public Safety, Iowa 
Communications Network, and the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department.  The 
order directs these agencies to develop a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy which addresses lifeline criti-
cal infrastructure, risk assessments, best practices, awareness training, public education and communication, 
collaboration, K-12 and higher education, data breach notifications, and incident response planning to protect 
the citizens of Iowa and Iowa businesses. 
The EO87 Leadership Team, along with several key partners, worked diligently over the last six months to 
prepare recommendations that will have a direct and sustainable impact on protecting lifeline critical infra-
structure, reducing risk to government operations, and creating sustainable partnerships in cybersecurity.
Scope of the Strategy:
The strategy includes a brief description of each 
executive order element, background information, 
current state, and recommendations for improving 
our current state. The primary focus of the strategy 
is lifeline critical infrastructure sectors (Communica-
tion, Energy, Transportation, and Water & Wastewa-
ter) and state government as it relates to the protec-
tion of citizens and digital government services.  
The strategy does not include detailed operational 
plans.  At the direction of the Governor’s Office and Iowa Legislature, the EO87 Leadership Team will pre-
pare an operational plan, budget, and timelines based on the accepted recommendations.
“The bad news is that data breaches are becoming ever more common. The worse news is that the cost they 
represent for companies is going through the roof.
Those are two conclusions from a study released Wednesday by IBM Security and the Ponemon Institute, 
which found that the average cost of a data breach has grown to $4 million. That’s a hefty jump compared 
with last year’s $3.79 million, and it represents an increase of almost 30 percent since 2013. This year’s data 
uncovered a 64 percent increase in reported security incidents between 2014 and 2015. Meanwhile, the 
study found that companies now lose some $158 per compromised record. In highly regulated industries 
like healthcare, the damage is even worse, reaching $355 per record.”2  
“I, Terry E. Branstad, Governor of the 
State of Iowa, declare cybersecurity 
a top priority for this administration 
and the State of Iowa should protect 
its citizens and economy against 
cyberattacks.” 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2Preface:  Executive Summary
Overall Management and Sustainability Recommendations:
1. Direct the Office of the Chief Information Officer to formalize and chair the ongoing partnership, collab-
oration, and structure with the Iowa National Guard, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Manage-
ment Department, Iowa Communications Network, Office of the Chief Information Officer, the Depart-
ment of Public Safety and other key partners as deemed appropriate by the chair; 
 a. Manage all cybersecurity functions as a centralized and accountable state program.
 b. Sustain mutual support and collaboration with industry and federal partners.
 c. Monitor Executive Branch cybersecurity threat and mitigation efforts.
 d. Conduct regular internal and external cybersecurity tests and exercises.
 e. Develop budgetary and other Executive and Legislative support requests.
 f. Report to the Governor and Legislature on strategy progress annually.
 g. Update this strategy every two years.
Specific and Individual Recommendations: 
2.   Implement the following recommendations detailed in this report; 
 a. Implement the National Cybersecurity Framework.
 b. Formalize the Iowa Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan.  
 c. Refine the risk assessment process  and report on cybersecurity risks within state 
     government and lifeline critical infrastructure. 
 d. Consolidate duplicative security products, processes and resources.
 e. Require cybersecurity awareness training, measure effectiveness and report progress.  
 f. Institute a public cybersecurity awareness campaign.
 g. Conduct joint training and exercises within state government and with private sector partners  
     identified in Iowa Cyber Incident Response Plan.
 h. Develop STEM scholarships and support structures for the cybersecurity workforce.
 i. Introduce required changes to the Iowa Data Breach notification law.
 j. Incorporate an incident response structure and plan for significant cyber events.
By implementing the recommendations in this report, Iowa will be better able to respond to cybersecurity 
events, and in-fact proactively mitigate risks for its citizens and government operations.  
Combining the accountability of an annual report that includes summarizing risks, priorities, financial and 
budgetary items, issues, status of initiatives, along with formalizing the EO87 Leadership Team, improves 
the coordination and increases effectiveness of the state’s incident response to cybersecurity events.
Respectively and collectively submitted,
Robert S. von Wolffradt
Chief Information Officer
State of Iowa
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4Background: Introduction
Background:
The recognition that cybersecurity threats can cause catastrophic consequences serves to strengthen the 
importance of a robust and integrated planning effort for a significant cyber incident.  According to a report 
from the Center for Digital Government “the threats to government entities are so pervasive and sophisti-
cated that anyone can fall victim, particularly as government agencies are strapped for resources. While the 
above provides information concerning anecdotal examples, statistical data shows an even more startling 
scenario of the cyber threats with which state and 
local governments must contend. Consider: 
• The total number of records containing sensi-
tive personal information involved in security 
breaches in the United States was over 608 
million records among 3,763 data breaches 
since January 2005.
• Malicious attacks (defined as a combination 
of hacking and insider theft) accounted for 
nearly 47 percent of the recorded breaches 
in 2012 in the United States. Hacking attacks 
were responsible for more than one third (33.8 
percent) of the data breaches recorded.
• Government agencies have lost more than 94 
million records of citizens since 2009.
• The average cost per lost or breached record 
is $194.”3
In 2012, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta pointed out our nation’s increasing vul-
nerability to a cyber-attack and the ability that 
foreign hackers have to disrupt our government, power grid, transportation system and financial networks. 
He likened the threat to our nation’s cyber systems to a “cyber Pearl Harbor.”5
According to a 2013 report from the National Governors Association : “cybersecurity remains one of the 
most significant challenges facing the nation. Although implementing policies and practices that will make 
state systems and data more secure will be an iterative and lengthy process, governors can take a number of 
actions immediately that will help detect and defend against cyber-attacks occurring today and help deter 
future attacks. 
Those actions include:
• Establishing a governance and authority structure for cybersecurity;
• Conducting risk assessments and allocating resources accordingly;
• Implementing continuous vulnerability assessments and threat mitigation practices;
• Ensuring the state complies with current security methodologies and business disciplines in cybersecu-
rity; 
• Creating a culture of risk awareness.
By implementing those recommendations immediately, governors can greatly enhance states’ cybersecu-
rity posture.”6
“The increasing dependency upon in-
formation technology systems and net-
worked operations pervades nearly ev-
ery aspect of our society. While bringing 
significant benefits, this dependency can 
also create vulnerabilities to cyber-based 
threats. Underscoring the importance of 
safeguarding critical information and 
information systems and weaknesses 
in such efforts, federal information se-
curity and protecting computerized 
systems supporting our nation’s critical 
infrastructure are designated a high-risk 
area.” 4
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Current State:  Introduction
Current State:
Cybersecurity is a top priority not only in Iowa, 
but for our nation and throughout the world. It is 
a threat that affects us all; citizens, governments 
and businesses.  The State of Iowa, like many 
states and organizations, faces serious challenges 
in securing our digital infrastructure and infor-
mation technology systems from cyber-attacks.  These attacks not only threaten the critical infrastructure 
that deliver lifeline services, but can also disrupt the delivery and integrity of government services our 
citizens are dependent upon.   
The State of Iowa is moving in the right direction when it comes to securing our digital infrastructure and 
information technology systems from cyber-attacks. 
 
 
The EO87 Leadership Team represents a multi-agency partnership established by the Governor’s office 
because each agency plays a critical role in protecting state government and lifeline critical infrastructures 
from constant cybersecurity threats.   This group will continue to work together to promote and develop 
solutions to address these cyber-related challenges. 
Other partnerships and relationships currently exist today to deal with the persistent threat of cyber-attacks. 
State agencies work with federal partners, other states, local governments, universities and schools, and 
the private sector through a variety of venues.  Our goal is to enhance, improve, and formalize many of 
these key existing partnerships as well as identify new avenues for collaboration and partnership to protect 
Iowans from the persistent threat of cyber-attacks.
2013 CIO Legislation; 
Authority and 
Responsibility 
established
2014 Office of the 
CIO created
2012 Governor 
hires State CIO 
2014 Governor 
Branstad establishes 
Cyber Working Group
2015 Iowa Winter 
Cyber Summit held
2015 Iowa Cyber 
Incident Response 
Plan drafted
2016 Iowa National 
Guard Cyber
Protection Team created
2016 Cybersecurity
Strategy delivered
2015 Governor 
Branstad signs 
Executive Order 87
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“Government agencies have lost more 
than 94 million records of citizens
since 2009.”  
6Section 1:  Protecting Lifeline Critical Infrastructure
1. Protecting Lifeline Critical Infrastructure:
Address high risk cybersecurity areas for the State’s critical infrastructure and develop plans to better 
identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover from significant cyber incidents.
Background:
“The first nation-state warfare took place between soldiers on the ground, and then ships at sea.  In the 
20th century the battle moved to the skies.”7   The battle is moving to cyberspace.  Our national well-being 
relies upon a secure and resilient infrastructure.  Protecting critical infrastructure from cyber-attacks is a 
global and national need.  The chart below shows that 50% of the confirmed cyber-attacks reported in 2014 
were targeted against the United States.  “Western infrastructure is a target for several kinds of threat actors 
including, but not limited to, nation-state hackers, cybercriminals, cyber terrorists and hacktivists.  A mali-
cious code spread in cyberspace could put the lives of entire populations in danger.  The protection of criti-
cal infrastructure is a pillar of any government’s cyber strategy.”8  National Security Agency Chief Admiral 
Michael Rogers informed Congress last year that “China and ‘probably one or two other’ countries have the 
capacity to shut down the nation’s power grid and other critical infrastructure through a cyber attack...”9  
There is no time to waste when it comes to protecting critical infrastructure.   
United States
Australia
United Kingdom
New Zealand
Germany
Colombia
Other
                                                                                                                                                                                                        50%
                                                                                            24%
                                                  14%
2%
2%
2%
                 6%
0%               5%              10%            15%            20%            25%             30%            35%            40%             45%            50%            55%
   
     
Share of Cyber-Attacks
(Graph Generated by Statistica - 2016)
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Section 1:  Protecting Lifeline Critical Infrastructure
A report by the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) in the United 
States reports that industrial control systems were hit by cyber-attacks at least 245 times over a 12 month 
period from October 2013 to September 2014.  Around 32% of industries were from the energy sector, while 
critical manufacturing comprised 27%.  ICS-CERT further revealed that 55% of investigated incidents 
showed signs that advanced persistent threats, or targeted attacks, had been used to breach systems. 
The State of Iowa is accustomed to responding to natural disasters as they relate to snow storms, floods and 
tornados.  Iowa Homeland Security Emergency Management Department (HSEMD), the Iowa National 
Guard (ING) and law enforcement respond to these events as part of their ongoing missions in a disaster.  
These events are sporadic and infrequent when compared to the nature of cyber-attacks.  Cyber-attacks are 
occurring every second of everyday and are capable of disrupting the critical lifeline services we depend on 
such as the delivery of electricity, water, communications, transportation and fuel distribution.  
Lifeline critical infrastructure sectors typically employ production systems called Industrial Control Sys-
tems (ICS).  ICS are typically used for industrial production purposes in industries such as electric, water 
and wastewater, oil and natural gas, and the transportation sectors.  They typically include electro-mechan-
ical devices that open and close electrical breakers, valves controlling the flow of liquids, or other devices or 
switches critical to important industrial processes that can be amenable to cyber manipulation.
Because of the relationship between IT systems 
and ICS in our state’s lifeline critical infrastruc-
ture, disruption of any one of the systems during 
a cyber-attack can create a life-threatening situ-
ation to the public.  Likewise, because of their 
interrelated nature, the disruption of any one of 
the lifeline sectors is likely to have a cascading 
effect on other critical infrastructure sectors.  
Therefore, cyber incidents carry with them the 
potential for physical consequences such as the 
actual loss of life or property, civil unrest, or 
significant impact on the health or economic 
security of the state. Over 90% of the critical infrastructure is provided by the private sector, and therefore 
government must play a key role in collaboration, planning and coordinating with these sectors.  
In addition to the disruption of lifeline critical infrastructure due to a cyber-attack, a successful cyber-attack 
against state government can disrupt the delivery of government provided services.  This will adversely im-
pact our citizens who depend on these services in their day-to-day lives.  Government services which were 
historically delivered through manual processes have been automated to provide faster and easier access 
to information and reduce the overall cost of government.   Maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of these digital systems is crucial for the State of Iowa.
Current State:
The ability of lifeline critical infrastructure to successfully perform these five functions—to identify, protect, 
detect, respond, and recover from significant cyber incidents is essential to their ability to manage cyberse-
curity risk.  HSEMD in conjunction with the Department of Public Safety’s (DPS) Division of Intelligence 
and Fusion Center collaborates with the private sector critical infrastructure owners. Iowa Code § 29C.8 
“There have been, as of this writing, only 
four secretaries of homeland security. 
Each of them has conceded the likelihood 
of a catastrophic cyberattack affecting 
the power grid; none has developed a 
plan designed to deal with the
aftermath. ” 10
8Section 1:  Protecting Lifeline Critical Infrastructure
(3) (e) requires HSEMD to maintain a list of critical assets including their criticality, vulnerability, and level 
of threat to the assets.  Those critical assets are maintained in conjunction with United States Department 
of Homeland Security (US-DHS) Office of Infrastructure Protection and the US-DHS Protective Security 
Advisor and include a cyber vulnerability assessment.  HSEMD staff members also meet with lifeline sector 
partners to discuss the resiliency of their systems and build relationships in advance of a disaster response.  
Discussions include their area of service, potential impacts, and redundancies in place, and capability or 
resource gaps that may exist in cases of a cyber-attack or other disaster.  
The recently established Iowa Air National Guard Cyber Protection Team (CPT) offers significant potential 
to assist both the State of Iowa and private sector critical 
infrastructure in responding to significant cyber events. 
The CPT has special skills and expertise that can be used 
to coordinate, train, advise, and assist critical infrastruc-
ture partners and state government in developing po-
tential strategies, plans, and solutions for dealing with 
significant cyber events.  Guidelines for utilizing the CPT 
for cyber preparedness or response are outlined in Ap-
pendix E.    
The Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) is also actively working 
with key Iowa utility providers to review cyber capabili-
ties.  The IUB is very concerned and engaged in the issue 
of cybersecurity both with respect to agency operations 
and the operation of utilities in Iowa. The IUB has previ-
ously met with many utilities in Iowa to discuss their 
efforts in this area and will continue to do so on a regular 
basis to ensure Iowa utilities are adequately prepared.  
The IUB participates in agency, state and national efforts 
in emergency planning and preparedness which includes 
participation in national discussions on cybersecurity 
through organizations in which we have members as 
well as internal and external testing and training exer-
cises. The IUB represents an important conduit of infor-
mation connecting public utilities with federal, state, local, and industry efforts to share best practices, to 
respond to threats and to protect our infrastructure.
 “A spokesman for the Iowa Utilities Board said the board staff ‘has held individual meetings with all utili-
ties and some trade associations in the gas, electric, telecom and water sectors. The participants gave a high 
level overview of their company cybersecurity efforts and the board staff’s understanding is that the utili-
ties have good policies/procedures in place to detect and address the vulnerabilities of the networks to a 
large extent’.”11  
As part of the State of Iowa’s Continuity of Operations and Continuity of Government program (COOP/
COG), State of Iowa agencies and offices have identified essential functions they perform and the digi-
tal systems used to support those functions.  Potential impacts have been determined based upon public 
health, safety, financial and other key factors.  Initiatives are ongoing to ensure the most critical systems are 
resilient and redundant. 
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Section 1:  Protecting Lifeline Critical Infrastructure
1. Protecting Lifeline Critical Infrastructure Recommendations:
 
Recommendation 1.1 – Implement the National Cybersecurity Framework to create a baseline for measur-
ing cybersecurity risk and assessing progress in lifeline critical infrastructure services and state government.
Recommendation 1.2 – Formalize the Iowa Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan and necessary agree-
ments and processes for collaboration between state agencies, and regularly exercise the plan.
Recommendation 1.3 - Continue forging partnerships with lifeline critical infrastructure sectors to ensure 
the resiliency of digital systems.  Promote and facilitate joint training and exercise scenarios.  
Recommendation 1.4 – Promote additional public and private assessment processes such as the HSEMD/
US-DHS Critical Infrastructure IP Gateway Survey Program and the Iowa Utilities Board cyber reviews.
Recommendation 1.5 – Leverage state resources, such as the Iowa Communications Network pursuant to 
IAC 8D.9 (3) to test, secure and protect critical communication infrastructure. 
The State of Iowa has forged many key relationships with educational and private sector partners to better 
identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover from significant cyber incidents affecting high risk critical in-
frastructure.  Safeguard Iowa Partnership and the Iowa InfraGard Chapter serve as conduits for establishing 
public and private sector partnerships and collaboration.  Additionally, the State of Iowa often participates 
in national and Iowa based cyber exercises such as ISERange, Cyber Prelude, Vigilant Guard and Cyber 
Storm which may involve both public and private sector organizations.
10
Section 2:  Risk Assessment
2. Risk Assessment:
Establish a process to regularly assess cybersecurity infrastructure and activities within the State.
Background:
Cybersecurity risk assessments are important because they increase accountability, improve transparency, 
and educate state government on where to direct limited resources, identify high risk areas, and augment 
continuity of government initiatives. 
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) “… assessing risk is one element of a 
broader set of risk management activities. Other elements include establishing a central management focal 
point, implementing appropriate policies and related controls, promoting awareness, and monitoring and 
evaluating policy and control effectiveness. Although all elements of the risk management cycle are impor-
tant, risk assessments provide the foundation for other elements of the cycle. In particular, risk assessments 
provide a basis for establishing appropriate policies and selecting cost-effective techniques to implement 
these policies. Since risks and threats change over time, it is important that organizations periodically reas-
sess risks and reconsider the appropriateness and effectiveness of the policies and controls they have se-
lected. This continuing cycle of activity, including risk assessment, is illustrated in the following depiction 
of the risk management cycle.”12
 Current State:
Internal cybersecurity risk assessment processes 
are not new to the State of Iowa.  Within the 
Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), 
the Information Security Office (ISO) has con-
ducted cybersecurity risk assessments for the 
past eight years.  The ISO originally utilized 
the ISO27001 cybersecurity risk assessment 
framework.  It was customized for the state as 
annual agency compliance status reports were 
required.  In 2014, the Center for Internet Secu-
rity Critical Security Controls (CIS-CSC) were 
included in the cybersecurity risk assessment 
process.  In addition to the ISO risk assessments, 
the Auditor of State utilizes Federal Information 
Systems Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM) as a 
framework for auditing state agencies.  This is 
a federal framework from the GAO.  A number 
of state agencies are required to have regular cy-
bersecurity risk assessments as part of their federal compliance responsibilities and also rely on third parties 
to perform periodic assessments.
In addition to internal cybersecurity risk assessments, the State of Iowa also partners with other govern-
ment entities and private sector critical infrastructure providers to assist with assessments.  The ISO part-
ners with the Iowa County Information Technology (ICIT) Security workgroup to share technology and 
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Section 2:  Risk Assessment
partner on initiatives and assessments. In conjunction with the United States Department of Homeland 
Security (US-DHS), Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department (HSEMD), provides 
a Critical Infrastructure Protection program that includes a cybersecurity assessment for the private sector 
partners.  Additionally, Safeguard Iowa acts on behalf of HSEMD to create public and private partnerships 
and facilitate cybersecurity assessments.   
These assessments have been used to identify and prioritize several statewide cybersecurity projects and 
priorities.  Based on findings from these assessments, initiatives in the areas of Vulnerability Management, 
Intrusion Detection, Anti-Malware, and Security Awareness training have been undertaken.  
2.  Risk Assessment Recommendations:
Recommendation 2.1 – Report annually to the Governor’s Office and Iowa Legislature on the current state 
of cybersecurity risk, COOP/COG, and IT Disaster Recovery readiness for the Executive Branch.
Recommendation 2.2 – Assemble a working group of public and private subject matter experts to evalu-
ate the current risk assessment process and make specific recommendations for improving the overall 
process.
Recommendation 2.3 – Improve accountability and transparency of state government’s cybersecurity pos-
ture by creating a cybersecurity risk assessment report card.
12
Section 3:  Best Practices
3. Best Practices:
Provide recommendations related to securing networks, systems, and data, including interoperability, 
standardized plans and procedures, and evolving threats and best practices to prevent the unauthorized 
access, theft, alteration, and destructions of data held by the State of Iowa.
Background:
Iowa’s state government is a complex organization with over 35 agencies, elected offices, boards, commis-
sions and two other branches of government.  These agencies and entities have a diverse set of missions, 
priorities, funding streams, and federal obligations.  Their digital environment is no less complex or diverse. 
Many of these systems are intertwined both internally and externally with third party entities such as cities, 
counties, schools, and the federal government.  Additionally, many solutions are provided or supported 
by third party vendors.  What is common among all of these entities is the need for the consistent, accurate 
and reliable delivery of government services to our citizens and the protection of the data and the digital 
infrastructure that delivers these services.  Initiatives for improving cybersecurity for the State of Iowa and 
implementing best practices should be viewed as bipartisan in nature and take a risk management approach 
by prioritizing limited resources to protect the most important digital infrastructure systems first. 
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Section 3:  Best Practices
Current State:
Implementing cybersecurity best practices has always been a goal of state government.  For a number of 
years, the state has been subject to both internal and external cybersecurity requirements, standards, poli-
cies, and audits.  
Internally, Executive Branch agencies are subject to periodic audits by the Auditor of State.  Findings are 
published and addressed accordingly.  The state’s Chief Information Officer (CIO) within the Office of the 
Chief Information Officer (OCIO) establishes policies and minimum IT standards for state government.  
Agencies are empowered to implement more stringent security standards to meet additional requirements 
of their agency.  The CIO also prioritizes enterprise security initiatives for state government.   A number of 
key initiatives have been implemented to date.  These are selected based upon recommendations from the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Internet Security – Critical Controls (CIS-
CS) findings from annual agency risk assessments.  
Many of the state agencies must comply with external cybersecurity requirements as well.  Some of these 
requirements include federal compliance with the Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal Justice Informa-
tion Systems (CJIS), the Internal Revenue Service Publication 1075, the Health and Human Services Health 
Insurance portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the Social Security Administration.  
While we strive to meet compliance requirements, we first and foremost focus our efforts on securing the 
data and applying industry leading best practices.  These recommendations are high level and broad in 
nature.  Specific recommendations will be identified in the operational plan to follow.
3. Best Practice Recommendations:
Recommendation 3.1 – Fully implement the CIS-CS Controls for Effective Cyber Defense which offers 
guidance for securing networks, systems and data with a prioritized risk based approach. 
 
Recommendation 3.2 - Leverage the findings from the 2016 Executive Branch Cybersecurity Survey and 
create an operational plan, timeline and budget which addresses gaps and prioritizes remediation within 
the CIS-CS and National Cybersecurity Security Framework.
Recommendation 3.3 – Reduce duplicative security products and initiatives and consolidate resources 
and solutions under the OCIO.  
14
Section 4:  Awareness Training 
4. Awareness Training: 
Implement cybersecurity awareness training for State government.
Background:
A robust information security awareness training plan is a vital pillar of any information security program.  
Information security awareness programs address the human element of cybersecurity risks across the mul-
tiple roles that interact with digital information.  
While it is impossible to prevent every person from falling for a cyber-attack, educating employees has 
proven to be an effective method of reducing the overall risk.  Security technologies exist to reduce and pre-
vent attacks, but are only partial solutions for addressing the overall problem. We must address the human 
element as well.  Requirements for information security awareness training are found in all of the major 
information security frameworks and federal auditing requirements. 
Current State:
Since the inception of the Information Security 
Office (ISO), cybersecurity awareness training 
has been and continues to be a key mission of the 
office.  The ISO provides basic information to all 
state employees as well as customized role-based 
information to target audiences. The program 
has evolved over the years and also includes 
outreach to many local government partners, 
schools, and non-profits.  Many state agencies 
who are subject to federal audit requirements 
have built cybersecurity awareness training programs to ensure the proper handling of citizens’ private 
data.  Several of these programs predate the Internet.  
The ISO serves as the relay point for the distribution of cybersecurity awareness materials distributed by 
the Multi State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
United States Department of Homeland Security (US –DHS), and other organizations.  The ISO redistributes 
materials to targeted audiences, makes training available to all state agencies, cities, and counties, publishes 
and distributes threat intelligence information, as well as many other activities.  The state recently released 
a Request for Proposal for new cybersecurity awareness training and is identifying new ways to improve 
the overall cybersecurity literacy of state employees. 
As part of the Executive Order 87 initiative, the EO87 Leadership Team surveyed all Executive Branch agen-
cies and invited the elected offices and other branches of government to participate in the process.  Based on 
the survey results and other inquiries in the process, recommendations are as follows.
“...the vast majority of hacking attacks 
are successful because employees click 
on links in tainted emails, companies 
fail to apply available patches to known 
software flaws, or technicians do not 
configure systems properly.” 13
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Section 4:  Awareness Training
4. Awareness Training Recommendations:
                    
Recommendation 4.1 – Require general cybersecurity awareness training for all State of Iowa employees 
and additional specialized cybersecurity awareness training for employees with privileged access. Conduct 
regular testing to measure the overall effectiveness of the training.
Recommendation 4.2 – Further educate State of Iowa leadership on cybersecurity risk and their roles and 
responsibilities.
Recommendation 4.3 – Create a cybersecurity training environment to facilitate cross agency training.  
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Section 5:  Public Education and Communication
5. Public Education and Communication:
Identify opportunities to educate the public on ways to prevent cybersecurity attacks and protect the 
public’s personal information.
Background:
Cyber criminals, hackers, and malware are thriving in part because too many people are blindly relying 
on technology as their main line of defense against cyber-attacks.  Although necessary, technical security 
measures like firewalls, patches, and anti-virus software are not completely reliable because cyber criminals 
have evolved and now focus on human vulnerabilities such as curiosity to accomplish their goals.  Simply 
clicking on an email link, visiting the wrong website, or falling for an email scam can have dire financial 
consequences and put citizen’s privacy at risk. As a result, the decisions that people do and do not make 
in the course of their daily interactions with information technology often have the greatest effect on the 
security of their computers and the confidentiality of their personal information.  The State of Iowa is in a 
position to play a leadership role in developing and disseminating materials to every citizen on how to take 
an active role in their own cyber defense.
“When asked why they don’t always do all the things they can or should do to stay safer online, Americans 
said they simply lacked the information or knowledge (28 percent) - a surprising finding that surpassed 
other hurdles often cited by the media. Only 12 percent said online safety was too expensive, while just 5 
percent said they were too busy to take the extra step.
Concern about identity theft rates slightly higher than fears of job and healthcare loss. 54 percent of Ameri-
cans are extremely concerned about loss of personal or financial information. To place this is in context, 53 
percent are concerned about losing their jobs, while 51 percent feared not being able to provide healthcare 
for their family.
Nearly two-thirds of the American public have heard, read or seen something about online safety and secu-
rity issues recently. However, most of what the news they remember is negative: identity theft, privacy loss, 
and increased frequency of attacks.”14
Current State:
Both the Iowa State Patrol and the Division of Criminal Investigation’s Internet Crimes Against Children 
(ICAC) Task Force provide educational presentations on Internet safety.  Approximately 1,700 presentations 
are conducted annually reaching over 44,000 Iowans.
The State of Iowa Information Security Office (ISO) educates individuals in state and local government, 
K-12 schools, the business community and the public about cybersecurity best practices and cyber-threats. 
The ISO distributes Security News about emerging cyber-threats and security best practices to 1500+ indi-
viduals annually in the public and private sectors and hosts in-person cybersecurity training sessions for 
state and local government and educators.  Online security awareness training was made available to K-12 
educators and public librarians to help raise awareness about the importance of good cybersecurity prac-
tices. The ISO also provides speakers on a regular basis for information security conferences and events.  
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Section 5:  Public Education and Communication
Security best practice guides and awareness handouts are distributed to state agencies, public universities, 
counties, cities, K-12 school districts, Area Education Agencies, community colleges, municipal utilities, and 
public libraries during cybersecurity awareness month in October and throughout the year.
5. Public Education & Communication Recommendations:
Recommendation 5.1 – Institute a public cybersecurity awareness and literacy campaign to improve the 
cybersecurity awareness of Iowans and promote good cyber hygiene.  
Recommendation 5.2 – Facilitate and sponsor an annual public and private cybersecurity conference.
Recommendation 5.3 - Provide cybersecurity awareness and literacy curricula and support materials for 
K-12 and college students.
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Section 6:  Collaboration
6. Collaboration:
Collaborate with the private sector and educational institutions to implement cybersecurity best practices.
Background:
Collaboration is a key element to any cybersecurity strategy.  By working with government, and education and 
industry partners, the group can enhance the overall security of the state.  Information sharing is critical to ad-
dress the advanced cyber- threats facing the state. Such collaboration can include: 
• Sharing threat intelligence
• Preparedness training and exercises
• Best of breed solutions
“Everyone has a collective responsibility for the security of the Internet: multistakeholder cross-border collabora-
tion is an essential component. Commercial competition, politics and personal motivation play a role in how well 
collaboration happens. But, as collaborative efforts have demonstrated, differences can be overcome to cooper-
ate against a threat. Such voluntary as-needed ‘working for the benefit of everyone’ collaboration is remarkable 
for its scalability and its ability to adapt to changing conditions and evolving threats, yielding unprecedented 
efficacy.”15
Current State:
The State of Iowa Information Security Office (ISO) collaborates with federal, state and local government entities 
on numerous cybersecurity efforts.  These include participation in national workgroups, specific cybersecurity 
projects, information sharing, and multi-agency exercises to name a few. Some of the groups the ISO collaborates 
with include: Safeguard Iowa, InfraGard, Technology Association of Iowa, Multi-State Information Sharing & 
Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), Iowa County Information Technology (ICIT), Board of Regents Information Security 
(BORIS), and Iowa State University Cybersecurity Advisory Council. The ISO supports MS-ISAC efforts to reach 
out to local government and the public and has worked with universities to train state and local government IT 
staff in network protection, cyberterrorism defense and incident response.
6. Collaboration Recommendations:
Recommendation 6.1 – Improve and enhance current partnerships with educational institutions to identify 
cybersecurity best practices through internships and faculty expertise.
Recommendation 6.2 – Conduct cybersecurity training exercises across Executive Branch agencies and lifeline 
critical infrastructure sector partners.
Recommendation 6.3 – Identify, create, review and update legal agreements between collaborative partners to 
improve information sharing, preparedness and incident response.
Recommendation 6.4 - Expand private sector partnership programs to promote the sharing of criminal and 
cyber-threat information affecting the private sector in Iowa.
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Section 7:  STEM
7. STEM:
Recommend Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) educational and training programs for 
K-12 and higher educational programs in order to foster an improved cybersecurity workforce pipeline.
Background:
“In the government and government-related job sector, certain STEM disciplines have a shortage of posi-
tions at the Ph.D. level (e.g., materials science engineering, nuclear engineering) and in general (e.g., sys-
tems engineers, cybersecurity, and intelligence professionals) due to the U.S. citizenship requirement.”16
“Under any strategy, a state will need a cyber 
workforce with a wide array of skills, from profi-
ciency in higher order information science to risk 
assessment to behavioral sciences and a variety 
of less demanding skills, such as those necessary 
to reinforce the practice of cyber hygiene day in 
and day out. The state will have to compete with other governmental employers and private-sector employ-
ers in the market for cybersecurity workers. That market is diffuse and complex and best thought of as an 
amalgamation of many smaller labor markets for skilled workers. In each of those markets, the willing-
ness of public and private sector employers to pay, and of workers to respond to such inducement, will be 
among the key determinants of the level of cybersecurity afforded to a state or a business.”17
Information regarding STEM can be found at Iowastem.gov. The need for additional STEM workers along 
with the need for a cybersecurity workforce is well documented.  In order to increase the number of work-
ers there needs to be an increase in the number of students focused on cybersecurity.  
“Of the 30 fastest-growing occupations projected through 
2016, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational 
Outlook Handbook concludes that 16 require substantial 
mathematics or science preparation. Despite the numbers 
of graduates coming out of universities in the state, more 
must be done to encourage students to consider cybersecu-
rity careers and prepare for work in the field. There are two 
issues: universities need to attract American-born students into IT programs, and students must be aware 
obtaining a security clearance requires smart and safe lifestyle 
decisions. “18
What is at stake is far greater than the privacy of an individual, 
but instead the protection of our critical infrastructure systems, 
intellectual property, strength of our economy and national 
security.
Current State:
Iowa State University (ISU) is recognized by the National Secu-
rity Agency as one of the first seven Centers for Excellence.  
20
Section 7:  STEM
ISU participates in the National Science Foundation Scholarships for Service (SFS) program to support stu-
dents working in Information Assurance. Program participants will take courses in information assurance 
as part of their regular degree requirements. In addition, all scholarship recipients will become part of an 
SFS cohort group and participate in academic and social activities throughout the year. The scholarship also 
requires a service commitment consisting of a paid summer internship and two years of paid employment 
with a state or federal agency. The fellowship includes all tuition, room, board, books and fees, as well as an 
annual stipend for 2 years of an MS degree or 3 three years of a Ph.D. degree. ISU received its initial fund-
ing for the SFS program in 2001 and has received three renewals (total funding for the program to date is 
over $8,000,000). The SFS (Cyber Corps) Fellowship program at ISU has supported over 75 students study-
ing Information Assurance.  
Hyperstream and the IT-Olympics is a partnership between ISU and the Technology Association of Iowa 
created in 2008. The program is designed to allow Iowa high school clubs to explore and draw awareness 
of IT among high school students using inquiry-based learning which allows students to explore IT in a 
nonthreatening, experimental environment. The program has developed four content areas that the clubs 
have the opportunity to explore: cyber defense, robotics, application development, and multimedia. This is 
accomplished through a large group of IT professionals and school instructors dedicated to be the mentors 
for clubs during the year. To celebrate at the end of the school year, the clubs are invited to ISU for a two 
day event to participate in the four areas in fun.  This program has held statewide cyber defense competi-
tions for over 10 years with the goal of increasing the number of students entering the computer security 
field.  The Hyperstream and IT-Olympics program is currently in over 200 schools across the state of Iowa. 
ISU has developed a cybersecurity curriculum for high schools that is based off of our cybersecurity play-
ground called ISERink. This playground and corresponding curriculum enable high school students to 
explore cybersecurity.
ISU along with Des Moines Area Community College have been working on developing pathways for stu-
dents interested in cybersecurity from high schools to enter either a community college for 2 year education 
or on to a 4 year school. These pathways will be a model for cooperation between high schools, community 
colleges and ISU with the goal of increasing the number of students graduating with a degree in cybersecu-
rity.
7. STEM Recommendations:
Recommendation 7.1 – Incentivize Iowa students to pursue careers in cybersecurity through the creation 
of scholarship programs modeled after programs such as the Federal Cyber Corps; Scholarship for Service 
program, the AmeriCorps Model, the Military GI Bill, and others.
Recommendation 7.2 – Provide and encourage pathways to cybersecurity careers from K-12 through 
higher education.
Recommendation 7.3 – Conduct a review of the cybersecurity workforce requirements for the Executive 
Branch and recommend necessary adjustments. 
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Section 8:  Data Breach
8. Data Breach:
Establish data breach reporting and notification requirements.
Background:
“Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted 
legislation requiring private, governmental or educational entities to notify individuals of security breaches 
of information involving personally identifiable information.”19  This includes Iowa.
These laws were designed to protect citizens of each state by notifying them if their Personally Identifiable 
Information (PII) had been stolen.  PII often includes financial information, social security numbers, driver’s 
license numbers, credit card and medical information.  Studies have shown that every industry sector is 
subject to a data breach and depending on the type of data breach, the reporting and notifications can vary.  
It is critical to reduce the time between a breach being discovered to the time of reporting and notification to 
the impacted public.  This reduces the potential damage which can occur to a citizen’s private information 
and allows the public to take steps to protect themselves from further harm.  In order to reduce the impact 
of a privacy breach, plans and appropriate laws must be in place before a data breach occurs.  Data breach 
reporting also allows the security industry and government to measure the overall scope of the problem in 
order to allocate the necessary resources.  
Although a national data breach law and database have been discussed, there are currently no standard 
requirements.  Each state maintains their own notification requirements.   
Current State:
Iowa’s Security Breach Notification Law enacted in 2008 and codified at Iowa Code Chapter 715C imposes, 
among other things, an obligation on persons who own or license computerized data containing Iowa 
residents’ “personal information,” as defined by the statute, and which is the subject of a security breach, 
to notify the affected residents of, among other things, the fact of and circumstances related to the security 
breach.  The law was subsequently amended in 2014 to:
1. Expand the definition of “Breach of security” to include certain paper breaches;
2. Narrow the encryption safe harbor to be unavailable when encryption keys related to the improperly
acquired information were also obtained through the security breach;
3. Require the owner or licensor of the adversely affected data to notify the consumer protection division
of the attorney general’s office of significant security breaches (defined as security breaches affecting five
hundred or more Iowa residents).
Reporting a Data Breach - The Attorney General’s Website:
https://www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov/for-consumers/security-breach-notifications/
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Section 8:  Data Breach
Notwithstanding the legislative changes in 2014, recent increases in the occurrence of significant security 
breaches nationwide and observed legislative trends in other states to improve the force and efficacy of 
comparable security breach notification laws suggest that additional changes to Iowa’s Security Breach No-
tification Law are needed.  See Appendix B for additional details.
8. Data Breach Recommendations:
Recommendation 8.1 – Work with the Iowa Attorney General to introduce changes to Iowa’s Code Chap-
ter 715C which would facilitate greater insight into the security breaches occurring in the state and better 
protect the personal information of the citizens of Iowa.
Recommendation 8.2 – Participate in initiatives designed to standardize data breach notification require-
ments at a national level to aid in the protection of citizen privacy and establish consolidated standards and 
reporting.  
Recommendation 8.3 – Track and report the data breach impact to citizens of Iowa and Iowa businesses.
Email:
consumer@iowa.gov
Phone:
515-281-5926
Fax:
515-281-6771
Mail:
Consumer Protection Division
Security Breach Notifications
Office of the Attorney General 
of Iowa
1305 E. Walnut Street
Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0106
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Iowa Emergency Response Plan:  Cyber Annex
Iowa Emergency Response Plan – Cyber Annex:
The Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department shall update the State’s Emer-
gency Response Plan to deal with the physical consequences of a significant cyberattack against the 
State’s critical infrastructure.
“Having an incident response team can reduce the cost of a data breach by nearly $400,000 on average, the 
study’s authors said. Moreover, speed makes a difference. The study found that the average time to identify 
a breach was 201 days; the average time to contain it was 70 days.
In general, breaches that were identified in fewer than 100 days cost companies an average of $3.23 million, 
whereas those found after the 100-day mark cost $4.38 million.
Companies with business continuity management (BCM) processes in place were ahead there, discover-
ing breaches 52 days earlier and containing them 36 days faster than companies without, according to the 
study’s authors.”20
Typically, the emergency response to natural 
disasters starts at the local level and additional re-
sources are added by higher levels of government 
as the need arises.  The mantra that all disasters 
are local is particularly true for natural disasters 
in the sense that the disaster response begins and 
ends at the local level and that the cause of the 
disaster is a localized weather phenomenon or 
other local event.  In the case of a typical natural disaster, there may be small need for information sharing 
with the federal government.   
A significant cyber incident caused by a nation-state or other foreign actor will be different.  The conse-
quences will be felt locally—albeit on a widespread basis in the case of an attack against the electrical grid—
but the cause of the attack may originate far from the point of impact or damage.  Sharing information 
about the nature of the cyber-attack, its scope, and remediation techniques will be critically important.
In order to recover from the incident or remediate the effects of the attack on a local system, information 
about the nature of the attack and additional attacks, and the experience of those also affected by the attack 
will be important.  That type of intelligence information may well rest with federal authorities and their 
willingness to share that information may dictate how quickly local systems recover DPS Intelligence and 
Fusion Center will disseminate threat and mitigation information to private sector partners.
The Iowa Emergency Response Plan includes instructions, policies, and explanatory information related to 
many or all of the entities involved in emergency or disaster response, as well as information about the legal 
and administrative foundations for state emergency response, plan activation requirements, and the struc-
ture of the response organization.
Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department (HSEMD) maintains and updates the 
“Having an incident response team can 
reduce the cost of a data breach by 
nearly $400,000 ...”
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Iowa Emergency Response Plan:  Cyber Annex
Iowa Emergency Response Plan.  The plan detailing the state’s response to a significant cyber-attack against 
the state’s lifeline critical infrastructure should be set out in a Cyber Annex to the Iowa Emergency Re-
sponse Plan.  The Cyber Annex will follow the Iowa Cyber Incident Response Plan (ICIRP) drafted by the 
Cyber Working Group formed by Governor Branstad in December 2014. 
Iowa Cyber Incident Response Plan:
The ICIRP should set out the overall plan the State of Iowa will follow to coordinate an incident response to 
a significant cyber incident or attack against the State of Iowa’s information technology systems and ser-
vices or the systems or services belonging to the state’s broader lifeline critical infrastructures.
These significant cyber incidents by definition carry with them the potential for physical consequences such 
as the actual loss of life or property, civil unrest, or significant impact on the health or economic security of 
the state. 
General roles and responsibilities included in the plan:
• Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) should lead state government in protecting information
technology resources by identifying, protecting, detecting, responding and recovering from cybersecu-
rity events and incidents through its Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan.
• HSEMD should serve as the state’s lead in responding to the physical consequences of any significant
cyber event under the state’s Emergency Response Plan.
• Department of Public Safety (DPS) through its Intelligence Fusion Center and Cyber Crime Unit should
provide threat and mitigation assistance to the private sector as well as acting to investigate, attribute,
and prosecute cybercrimes.
• Iowa Communication Network (ICN), as the State of Iowa’s primary broadband carrier, provides and
manages Internet, network infrastructure and transport services.   At the direction of the OCIO, the ICN
will take actions to isolate the state’s IT systems from cyber-attacks pursuant to its Network Security
Incident Response Plan.
• Iowa National Guard through its Air Guard Computer Protection Team (CPT) will support the State of
Iowa in responding to a significant cyber incident.
Overall Incident Command:
The overall coordination of the cyber aspects of a significant cyber incident should vest in the coordinating 
entity that would deal with cyber recovery and remediation matter.  The response to the physical conse-
quences of a significant cyber event would be coordinated by HSEMD pursuant to its emergency response 
plan.
In addition to relevant State of Iowa agencies, the entity should include representatives from the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI), Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC), US Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), and representatives from the affected critical infrastructure.
25
Iowa Emergency Response Plan:  Cyber Annex
Federal partners that should be made part of any cyber response plan:   
• The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (US-DHS) through its Office of Cybersecurity and Commu-
nications coordinates the national effort for the protection, prevention, mitigation of, and recovery from
cyber incidents.  US-DHS also disseminates domestic cyber threat and vulnerability analysis involv-
ing critical infrastructure through the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
(NCCIC) and staffs the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).  US-DHS’s Industrial
Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) has special expertise with cyber-attacks
involving industrial control systems.
• Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) leads domestic national security operations
in respect to cyber incidents. The FBI also conducts domestic collection, analysis, and dissemination
of cyber threat intelligence and mitigation methods and investigates, attributes, and prosecutes cyber-
crimes.
• The Department of Defense (DoD) supports the national protection, prevention, mitigation of, and
recovery from cyber incidents. In addition to protecting national security and military systems, the DoD,
acting through the U.S. Cyber Command defends the nation from cyber-attacks. One of the goals of the
Iowa Air National Guard Cyber Protection Team is to support U.S. Cyber Command in its mission.
• Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) in Albany, New York, works with the
US-DHS NCCIC to provide cyber threat prevention, protection, response and recovery for the State of
Iowa and local governments.
• US-DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection working with HSEMD and the DPS Intelligence Fusion
Center and utilizing the IP Gateway system can share critical infrastructure-related cyber information
through the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information system in a way that protects that information
from disclosure to those that would seek to misuse that information.
Cyber Annex Recommendations:
Recommendation CA 1 - Develop a strategic direction on how the state prepares and responds when 
cyber-incidents involving lifeline critical infrastructure or state government escalate to a level of significance 
requiring a coordinated response from a State of Iowa and/or HSEMD perspective.
Recommendation CA 2 - Define a process to manage significant cyber incidents and provide a basis for 
continuing refinement of our processes and policies that address the path from steady-state to incident 
response.
Recommendation CA 3 - Formalize the Cyber Annex of the State of Iowa Emergency Response Plan and 
the Iowa Cyber Incident Response Plan with required reviews and updates every two years. 
Recommendation CA 4 - Exercise the Cyber Annex as part of the State of Iowa Emergency Response Plan 
and the Iowa Cyber Incident Response Plan.
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Appendix A :  Executive Order 87
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Appendix A :  Executive Order 87
Download Executive Order 87:
https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Executive%20Order%20No.%2087.pdf
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Appendix B :  Breach Legislation
A High Level Overview of the Legislative Changes to Iowa Code Chapter 715C Pro-
posed in This Document.
Notwithstanding the legislative changes in 2014, recent increases in the occurrence of significant security 
breaches nationwide and observed legislative trends in other states to improve the force and efficacy of 
comparable security breach notification laws suggest that additional changes to Iowa’s Security Breach 
Notification Law would facilitate greater insight into the security breaches occurring in the state and better 
protect the personal information of the citizens of Iowa.
Consistent with these objectives and the legislative changes observed in other states, the attached proposed 
legislative changes would, among other things:
1. Expand the definition of “Breach of security” to include not only cases where the owner or licensor of
personal information has actual knowledge that personal information has been acquired by an unau-
thorized person, but also cases where the owner or licensor possesses a reasonable belief that personal
information has been acquired by an unauthorized person;
2. Expand the definition of “Breach of security” and related provisions to apply to all paper breaches;
3. Establish a minimum encryption threshold, 128 bit or higher, in order to qualify for the encryption safe
harbor;
4. Expand the definition of personal information to include:
5. Impose a 45-day deadline on the consumer notification requirements following a data breach;
6. Narrow the “no reasonable likelihood of financial harm” exception to require a showing of “no reason-
able likelihood of harm,” as opposed to “financial harm,” in order to qualify for the exception;
7. Clarify that notification to the consumer protection division of the attorney general’s office is required in
a. Financial account number, credit card number, or debit card numbers acquired alone, as opposed
to in combination with any required expiration date, security code, access code, or password that
would permit access to an individual’s financial account as currently required;
b. Credit card numbers obtained alone, as opposed to in combination with an individual’s first name
or first initial and last name;
c. Medical information;
d. Health insurance information;
e. Tax identification numbers;
f. Individuals’ username or email addresses, in combination with a password or security question
and answer that would permit access to an online account.
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cases involving significant security breaches, regardless of whether consumer notification is required by 
Iowa Code Chapter 715C itself or other bodies of law that may otherwise exempt the owner or licensor 
of personal information from compliance with select provisions of Iowa Code Chapter 715C; 
8. Require that already required documented findings that a security breach is not reasonably likely to
cause harm to consumers be provided to the consumer protection division of the Attorney General’s of-
fice;
9. This change specifies what must be included in the notice sent to the Attorney General;
10. Require those who own, license, maintain, or possess Iowa resident’s personal information to imple-
ment reasonable security measures to safeguard such information;
11. This change authorizes a private right of action for this Chapter, in line with what is normally available
to consumers in the circumstance of a Consumer Fraud Act violation;
12. Include the Office of the Chief Information Officer in any data breach notifications made to the consum-
er protection division of the Attorney General.
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Appendix C:  General Financial Considerations 
The EO87 Leadership Team identified numerous recommendations to improve the cybersecurity posture of 
the state and protect the private data of the citizens of Iowa.  Presenting a strategy without acknowledging 
the potential need for funding would be incomplete.   Figure 1 identifies the EO87 elements where cyber-
security investments may be needed in support, tools and staffing.  We intend to provide specific details 
during the normal budgeting cycle. 
While funding and staffing needs to be addressed, we also believe savings can be achieved by eliminating 
duplication in both tools and staffing effort.  Financial recommendations will be based upon risk and the 
criticality of the infrastructure and government systems.  Understanding that protecting everything equally 
is not fiscally feasible or reasonable; any requests will be measured and specific. Specific spending on cyber-
security is not tracked and will require additional data gathering from individual agencies.  
Figure 1:
EO87 References Investments 
needed?
Cyber Defense 
Tools needed? 
Cyber Defense Staffing & 
Partners needed?
1. Protecting Lifeline Critical
Infrastructure
Yes Yes Yes
2. Risk Assessment Yes Yes Yes
3. Best Practices Yes Yes Yes
4. Awareness Training No No Yes
5. Public Education &
Communication
Yes No Yes
6. Collaboration Yes No Yes
7. STEM Yes No Yes
8. Data Breach No No No
Iowa Emergency Response Plan - 
Cyber Annex
No No No
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Appendix D:  General Legislative Considerations 
During the development of the cybersecurity strategy, the need for updates to the Iowa Code was identified. 
While specific language will need to be drafted, the following are areas which may need legislative changes 
to provide and assist in the protection of State of Iowa’s digital infrastructure. 
Figure 2:
EO87 Element Updates State of Iowa Code
1. Protecting Lifeline Critical Infrastructure Yes 29C
2. Risk Assessment Yes 2.x, 8B
3. Best Practices Yes 8B
4. Awareness Training No
5. Public Education & Communication Yes 8B
6. Collaboration No
7. STEM May
8. Data Breach Yes 88.x
Cybersecurity and open records considerations Yes 22
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Appendix E:  Iowa National Guard
The world of cyber has been, is and will continue to change and develop rapidly. How, when, where and 
the extent of incident responders’ involvement in responding to a cyber incident is difficult to predict. With 
that in mind, below is some general guidance and analytical tools to consider when employing Iowa Na-
tional Guard (ING) personnel in response to a cyber incident.
The primary mission of the Iowa Air National Guard Cyber Protection Team (CPT): Coordinate, Train, 
Advise and Assist (CTAA) support and services must be military training with incidental benefit to mission 
partners. Coordination with mission partners to protect DoD Information Network, enhance awareness, 
provide mission assurance and provide unity of effort is appropriate.  The ability and extent to which CPT 
CTAA support and services is available is dependent upon the nature of the mission partner (non-govern-
mental v. governmental).  DoD guidance with respect to all requests for assistance must be strictly adhered 
to.   Prior to providing CPT CTAA support and assistance to mission partners, a memorandum of agree-
ment (MOA) between the Iowa Air National Guard (IANG) and mission partner will be required.  Further, 
the IANG is not a replacement for mission partner’s responsibilities to maintain and employ its own IT 
subject matter experts, and to ensure security measures to protect the integrity of their computer networks.  
MOA must generally contain provisions including but not limited disclaimers of liability, non-disclosure 
agreements, reimbursement provisions (as applicable), scope and terms of services, third-party permissions, 
Proprietary Intellectual Property Methods and Protocols, contract termination terms, cost reimbursement (if 
applicable), modification terms and duration of the MOA.
Support provided by the ING while in state active duty (SAD) to state/local civil authorities for emergen-
cies/operations is state funded under the provisions of state law. States are free to employ their National 
Guard (NG) forces under state control for state purposes and at state expense as provided in the state’s con-
stitution and statutes. As such, service is performed in accordance with state law, ING members performing 
this type of duty are said to be in SAD status. National Guard Soldiers and Airmen serving in a SAD status 
are under the command and control of the Governor and the state or territorial government. 
Support provided by the ING under the command of the Governor, funded by DoD (Title 32). T32 Funding 
for Other Duty. Section 502(f) of T32 has been used to allow members of the NG to be ordered to full-time 
National Guard duty to perform training or operational activities. This section provides that “a member 
of the ING may ... without his consent, but with the pay and allowances provided by law ... be ordered 
to perform training or other duty” in addition to those they are already prescribed to perform. This is the 
provision of law which was used to provide federal pay and benefits to National Guard personnel who 
provided security at many of the nation’s airports after September 11, 2001, and who participated in Hurri-
canes Katrina and Rita-related disaster relief operations.  In accordance with 32 USC 502(f) (2), the President 
or Secretary of Defense may request operations or missions to be performed under the authority of Section 
502(f).
State governments bear all of the associated costs of NG members performing duties in a state active duty 
status per NG Regulation 500-5/ Air National Guard Instruction 10-208, Chapter 10, 10-2.  Governors can 
directly access and utilize the NG’s federally assigned aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment (subject to 
some restrictions based on federal law and regulation) so long as the federal government is reimbursed for 
the use of the equipment and supplies. There are specific reporting and reimbursement procedures and 
requirements to the federal government for the use of federal equipment or expenditure of federal supplies.
NG forces are unique in their ability to operate under a spectrum of federal and state statutes and authori-
ties including Titles 10, 18, 32 and 50; U.S.C.  Based on the breadth of authorities and their community-
based presence across the nation, the NG provides significant capability to facilitate work across federal, 
state, and private sector boundaries. In addition, NG uniqueness is also reflected in their routine interac-
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tions with both the private and public sectors. NG members typically have strong and enduring linkage at 
local, city, county, and state levels, based not only on their private sector positions and experience, but also 
on their state and local role as responders and incident managers during state and local emergencies under 
their Governor’s authorities.  SAD is governed by Iowa law, particularly Article VI of the Iowa Constitution 
and Iowa Code sections 29A.7 and 29A.8.   
DoDD 3025.10 provides that “the authority of state officials is recognized to direct a state immediate re-
sponse using NG personnel under State command and control (including personnel in a T32, U.S.C. status) 
in accordance with State law....”21  As the principle authority during state emergencies, governors may direct 
an immediate response using NG personnel under state command and control (including personnel in a 
T32 status); however, NG personnel will not be placed in or extended in T32 status to conduct State immedi-
ate response activities. Additionally, state leadership must coordinate with the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau to approve the continued use of personnel in a T32 status responding in accordance with immediate 
response authority in excess of seventy-two hours. Before deploying any forces in support on civilian au-
thorities a Commander in consultation with their JAG must consider the following criteria set out in DoDD 
3025.18.  
These criteria are known as the “CARRLL” factors:
• Cost – Who pays and the impact on DoD budget.
• Appropriateness – Whether it is in the interest of DoD to provide the requested support.
• Readiness – Impact on DoD’s ability to perform its primary mission.
• Risk – Safety of DoD forces.
• Legality – Compliance with the law.
• Lethality – Potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces.
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• BORIS – Board of Regents Information Security
• CARRLL – Cost, Appropriateness, Readiness, Risk, Legality, Lethality
• CIO – Chief Information Officer
• CIS – Critical Information Security
• CIS-CSC – Center for Internet Security – Critical Security Controls
• CJIS - Criminal Justice Information Systems
• COOP/COG – Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government
• CPT - Cyber Protection Team
• CTAA - Coordinate, Train, Advise and Assist
• US-DHS – United States -Department of Homeland Security
• DoD – Department of Defense
• DPS – Department of Public Safety
• EO – Executive Order
• FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation
• FTC – Federal Trade Commission
• FISCAM - Federal Information Systems Controls Audit Manual
• GAO – Government Accountability Office
• HSEMD – Homeland Security Emergency Management Department
• HIPAA –Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
• IANG – Iowa Air National Guard
• ICAC – Internet Crimes Against Children
• ICIRP – Iowa Cyber Incident Response Plan
• ICIT – Iowa County Information Technology
• ICN – Iowa Communications Network
• ICS – Industrial Control System
• ICS-CERT – Industrial Control Systems– Cyber Emergency Response Team
• ING – Iowa National Guard
• ISEAGE – Internet Scale Event & Attack Generation Environment
• ISO – Information Security Office
• ISU – Iowa State University
• IT – Information Technology
• IUB – Iowa Utilities Board
• MOA – Memorandum of Agreement
• MS-ISAC – Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center
• NCCIC - National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
• NG – National Guard
• NIST – National Institute of Standards & Technology
• OCIO – Office of the Chief Information Officer
• PII – Personally Identifiable Information
• SAD – State Active Duty
• SFS – Scholarship for Service
• STEM – Science, Technology, Engineering and Math
• US-CERT – U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
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